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The Rise Of Hizbut Tahrir In Indonesia (A Global and Local Nexus)

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Abstract

This article deals with the emergence and development of Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia. It argues that its emergence and rapid development cannot be isolated from global and local socio-political context. The global element was related to Islamic resurgence in the late 1970s which inspired the flowering of Islamic movements in the Muslim world. The local element was related to the repressive state toward the articulation of political Islam that made Muslim students find Islam as the outlet in the midst of their frustration toward the state. During the Soeharto era, HTI went underground and focused its energy on dakwah and cadre building. After the demise of Soeharto, however, HTI found its momentum to emerge in Indonesian public and has utilized the new democratic political sphere to advance its cause.

Keywords: *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Emergence, Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, The Fall of Soeharto, Transnational Islamic movement, Political Islam*

INTRODUCTION

The topic of Islamic radical movements in Indonesia - also referred as 'Islamic fundamentalist', 'Islamist', 'militant', and 'hardliner' - has won significant attention from scholars and observers. The mushrooming of such movements was apparent especially after the fall of Soeharto in 1998. The topic became even more interesting after the bombing attacks in a number of places in Indonesia from 2002 to 2005, which revealed the existence of an Islamist terrorist network in Southeast Asia called Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Various studies have been produced in response to the emergence of Islamic radical movements and terrorist groups. However, a lack of knowledge of the dynamics of Islamic movements in the region has resulted in misunderstandings and generalizations.

In general, Islamic radical movements in Indonesia can be categorized into the local and the transnational. The first, local group has emerged as a response to political and social changes in Indonesian history, without the strict adoption of and having no global links with those of the Middle East. This category includes the Darul Islam movement in West Java, Aceh and South Sulawesi during the 1950s and several Islamist movements emerging in the post-Soeharto reform era, such as MMI (Majelis

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Mujahidin Indonesia) and FPI (Front Pembela Islam). These groups were shaped wholly by Indonesian socio-political contexts and have no exact reference in terms of ideology or organization to any particular movement in the Middle East. Their struggle is limited to the nation, though they share the global agenda of Islamism, namely the implementation of *shari'a* or the establishment of an Islamic state. Transnational Islamist groups, on the other hand, draw direct inspiration, ideas, ideology, methods and networks from movements in other parts of the world as a result of globalization and human movement. In this respect, to borrow Mandaville's words, their "primary modes of organization and activism transcend the territorial boundaries of nation states".[1] In the Indonesian context, this sort of movement includes Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, the Salafi group, Jemaah Tabligh, and Jemaah Tarbiyah. These movements all have their origins in the Middle East and South Asia.

Focusing on Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, HTI, this chapter argues that its emergence and rapid development is inseparable from global and Indonesian socio-political contexts alike. Facing repression from the authoritarian state in Soeharto's New Order era, HTI operated underground and focused on education through its *halqa* (study circles) and confined its activities to university campus mosques. However, after the fall of Soeharto, HTI emerged into Indonesian public view, utilizing the new democratic political sphere to advance its cause by conducting various rallies, producing media and hosting seminars and discussions, etc. in order to disseminate its ideas and to gain public support.

The first part of this chapter deals with the origins and ideology of Hizbut Tahrir. The second part discusses the history of Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia and its general development from the New Order era to Post-New Order era and explores the socio-political contexts.

Hizbut Tahrir: Origins and Ideology

Hizbut Tahrir was founded in East Jerusalem in 1953 by the Palestinian Islamic legal scholar and political activist, Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani (1909-1977). An-Nabhani was educated in law at al-Azhar University in Cairo, and later worked as a religious teacher in high school, a chief clerk and then judge in the Islamic courts in Palestine.[2] Some writers suggest that he was a sympathizer, if not a member, of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), an Islamist movement of Egyptian origin founded in 1928. It is likely that An-Nabhani interacted with the MB ideas during his study in Egypt, for the impact of MB influences can be seen in his political and religious thought, especially in

[1]Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 279

[2]Suha Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate* (London: Grey Seal, 1996) 1-2. See also International Crisis Group, "Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to the Threat of *Hizbut Tahrir*", in *ICG Asia Report no.* 58, 30 June (2003), 2.

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the idea of the completeness of Islam and Islam as the solution for the *umma* in dealing with any problem, whether political, economic, social or cultural. Apart from this, An-Nabhani was also attracted by the ideals of the Syrian *Ba'th* party which upheld Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism, while basing his political views on Islam as the basic principle rather than the secular.[3] An-Nabhani called Hizbut Tahrir an Islamic political 'party' rather than an Islamic organization, following the trend of emerging Arab political parties since the 1930s. In relation to this, Suha Taji Farouki regards An-Nabhani as "one of the first Arab intellectuals to argue the case for a modern political party using the constructs of Islamic discourse".[4]

The establishment of HT appeared as a response by An-Nabhani to Western colonialism which had led to the fall of caliphate, the loss of Palestine and the separation of Arab-Muslim countries into a number of nation-states. His primary concern was therefore to unite the Arab-Muslim countries under a single caliphate.[5] In many of his works, An-Nabhani shows a pre-occupation with liberating Muslim countries from the impact of Western imperialism. In his *Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir* (Understanding Hizbut Tahrir) he wrote:

"…It (HT) stands against colonialism in all its forms and aims to liberate the *umma* from the colonialist intellectual leadership and to remove its cultural, political, military and economic influences from the Islamic lands. It also aims to change erroneous and distorted concepts spread by colonialism which restrict Islam to personal worship and morals".[6]

It is also worth noting that An-Nabhani's reaction to the West is more radical than that of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian Hasan al-Banna, since he made an absolute dichotomy between Islam and Western civilization, echoing the division put forward by the later leader of MB, Sayyid Qutb between Islam and the *jahiliyyah* (an ignorance of Islam). In this regard, An-Nabhani conceived of Islam as a 'self-sufficient principle', a 'comprehensive and thoroughly modern ideology' and superior to other ideologies coming from the West, i.e. capitalism and socialism.[7]

HT is a transnational Islamist movement with a distinctive political orientation. Differing from other Islamist groups, HT declares itself to be a political group, not an intellectual, spiritual or a social group.[8] However, it does not engage in electoral politics, since it explicitly rejects democracy. HT views democracy as an 'unbeliever system' (*sistem kufur*) which is contrary to Islam. For HT, Islam only recognizes God as

[3]Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest*, 4.
[4]Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest…*
[5]Taji-Farouki, "Islamists and Threat of *Jihad*: Hizb al-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun on Israel nd Jews", in *Middle Eastern Studies*, 36: 4 (October 2000), 22.
[6]Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, *Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir* (Jakarta: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2007), 128
[7]Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest*, 37-45
[8]Hizbut Tahrir, *Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir: Partai Politik Islam Ideologis* (Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, 2000), 1

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law maker, not human agency. Therefore, HT regards it *haram* (prohibited) for Muslims to adopt and propagate it.[9] Opposing the separation between religion and state, HT views politics as any effort to care for and maintain the matters of society in accordance with Islamic law and the solutions of Islam.[10] This is in line with the stated aim of HT, namely "to resume the Islamic way of life and to convey the call of Islam to the world." This for HT means "bringing Muslims back to living an Islamic way of life in *Dar al-Islam* (the domain of Islam) and in an Islamic society in which all of life's affairs in society are administered according to the rules of *shari'a,* regarding what is *halal* (lawful) and *haram* (prohibited) under the protection of the Islamic state, which is the Khilafah, the Caliphal state".[11] Thus the restoration of the caliphate, in HT's view, is essential in order to achieve the glory of Islam.

The re-establishment of the global caliphate is the major emphasis of HT's struggle, and due to its adherence to the ideal of *khilafah,* Peter Mandaville identifies HT as a *khilafist* group.[12] In the view of An-Nabhani, the caliphate of the Ottoman Empire, abolished in 1924, was the only authentic form of Islamic government to have a historical and doctrinal basis. Its restoration was axiomatic to ensure the comprehensive implementation of *shari'a*. If an Islamic state under the rule of a caliph were re-established it would spread Islamic ideas and precepts all over the world, "restoring the *umma* to its golden age as dominant in the world and spearheading a mission to liberate the globe from the evils of capitalist hegemony".[13] An-Nabhani asserted that the appointment of a caliph is an obligation upon Muslims. Albeit that the form of Islamic government is a debatable issue among Muslim scholars, An-Nabhani interpreted the caliphate as an obligation confirmed by the Qur'an, Hadith and Consensus of the Companions (*Ijma'*).[14] This is because numerous *shari'a* duties, such as the upholding of Islamic rules, the implementation of the penal code and guarding the frontiers of the state rely on the presence of a caliph. To advance his cause, An-Nabhani included in his book a detailed state constitution describing its political, social and economic systems, as well as educational and foreign policies.[15]

Hizbut Tahrir is radical in terms of its political ideas but emphasizes peaceful means to achieve its goal by emulating the Prophet's model of *da'wa*. HT is radical in so far as it favors fundamental political change through the replacement of the existing

[9]For HT's radical rejection of democracy, see Abdul Qadim Zallum, *Demokrasi: Haram Mengambilnya, Menerapkannya, dan Mempropagandakannya* (Bogor: Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, 1994)
[10]Hizbut Tahrir, *Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir: Partai Politik Islam Ideologis...*, 59
[11]Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest...*, 50
[12]Mandaville, *Global Political Islam...*, 266
[13]Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest...*, 77
[14]Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, *Daulah Islam* (Jakarta: HTI Press, 2007) 276
[15]See the constitution in An-Nabhani, *Peraturan Hidup dalam Islam* (Jakarta: HTI Press, 2008) 139-195.

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nation-states and the creation of a new Islamic state under one central ruler.[16] Differing from the Muslim Brotherhood, HT opposes gradualism (*tadarruj*) as it suggests a weakness and impracticality in Islam. Although HT claims itself to be anti-violent, the movement was involved in masterminding two attempted coups by sections of the armed forces of Jordan during 1968 and 1969.[17] Moreover, there have been several arrests of HT members allegedly involved in violent actions in Central Asia. However, in the Indonesian case, no evidence has been found to suggest links to violence or terrorism. One should refer to HT's ideology to understand its activism and possible connection with any *jihadi* action. Referring to the experience of the creation of an Islamic state in the period of the Prophet Muhammad, HT has envisaged three stages of political struggle:

1. **The Stage of Culturing**: "Finding and cultivating individuals who are convinced by the thought and method of the party. This is necessary in order to formulate and establish a group capable of carrying the party's ideas."
2. **The Stage of Interaction with the *Umma*,** in order to encourage the *umma* to embrace Islam, so that it works to establish Islam in life, state and society.
3. **The Stage of Taking Over Government**: "Establishing an Islamic state, implementing Islam generally and comprehensively and carrying its message to the world."[18]

These are the three steps of action to be used by HT to lead the *umma* to the establishment of an Islamic state. It is implied that the struggle should be started from below, using a bottom-up approach. It is therefore understandable why this transnational movement is very active in recruitment, culturing processes and spreading its ideas through media, pamphlets, seminars and rallies as part of undertaking the first and second stages.

Since its inception, HT leaders and members have faced challenges and crackdowns and this has created a world diaspora of its members. An-Nabhani himself experienced harsh repression by the Jordanian government; he was arrested on charges of subversion after submitting an application to register Hizbut Tahrir as a political organization.[19] This led him to live into exile in Jerusalem, Syria and Lebanon while disseminating his ideas and building HT chapters. An-Nabhani passed away in Beirut in 1977 and was succeeded as supreme leader by Abdul Qadeem Zallum, which position was then occupied by Ata Abu Rashta in 2003.[20] Like An-Nabhani, many of

[16]Karagiannis and Clark McCauley, "Hizbut Tahrir al-Islami: Evaluating the Threat Posed by a Radical Islamic Group That Remains Non-violent", in *Terrorism and Political Violence* 58 (2006) 318
[17]Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest*..., 27 and 168
[18]Hizb ut-Tahrir, *The Methodology of Hizbut Tahrir for Change* (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 1999) 32.
[19]Fealy, "Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia", 154.
[20]*Hizbut Tahrir*, "Profile: Ameer of *Hizbut Tahrir*", *Hizbut Tahrir Media Office (Official Website)*, ‹http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/info/english.php/contents_en/entry_299› accessed 5 March 2009

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his followers have faced repression from the authorities of Middle Eastern countries which has forced many of them to flee to Western countries. Since the early 1990s, Hizbut Tahrir has expanded quickly into Central Asia, North Africa, Turkey, Europe and Southeast Asia.[21] While Jordan probably serves as the central base, the UK has been regarded by many as the new HT headquarters and base of operations. HT itself has claimed to have branches (*wilayah*) in forty countries, making it a global movement with a strong world-wide network.

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Beginnings, Socio-Political Context and Development
Origins of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia

The coming of HT to Indonesia is linked to the HT community in Australia in the early 1980s. Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi and Mama Abdullah Nuh were two figures who played an important role in the expansion of HT in Indonesia in its earliest development.[22] Al-Baghdadi was an HT activist from Lebanon who had migrated to Australia in the early 1960s to escape persecution. It is reported that he had joined the armed struggle against Israel.[23] The latter figure, Abdullah bin Nuh, was head of the *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) of Al-Ghazali in Bogor, West Java. He was also a popular preacher and a Muslim scholar with expertise in Arabic literature, holding a chair in the Faculty of Arts, The University of Indonesia (UI) in Jakarta. His acquaintance with HT began while on a visit to his son, who was studying in Sydney. As Australia was one of destinations of HT migrants from the Middle East, it was among them that Abdullah bin Nuh met the charismatic young teacher, Al-Baghdadi. Engaging in dialogue and intensive discussions with al-Baghdadi, Bin Nuh was impressed by his advanced knowledge of Islam at his young age. Abdullah Nuh invited Al-Baghdadi to visit Bogor in order to help him to develop his *pesantren*.[24] It was from here then Al-Baghdadi began to disseminate the HT ideas in Indonesia.

Al-Baghdadi arrived in Indonesia in 1982 and spread HT teachings through Abdullah bin Nuh's *pesantren*. In this *da'wa* activity he interacted with Muslim student activists of the campus mosque Al-Ghifari of the Bogor Agricultural Institute (*Institut Pertanian Bogor*, IPB) and used the opportunity to introduce HT ideas to the students.[25] Since many students were attracted to his *da'wa*, he and bin Nuh began organizing recruitment and systematic education through training and *halqa*, the study circles.[26]

[21]Fealy, "Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia", 154.
[22]For a detailed account of the earlier history of HTI, see Agus Salim, *The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (1982-2004): Its Political Opportunity Structure, Resource Mobilization, and Collective Action Frames*, Unpublished MA Thesis (Jakarta: Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, 2005).
[23]Fealy, "Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia", 155.
[24]See Salim, *The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, 39-40. See also Fealy, "Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia", 154-155.
[25]Dwi Hardianto, "Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Dakwah Masjid yang Menggurita", in *Sabili* 9:11 (2003) 142.
[26]Fealy, "Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia"..., 155.

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IPB's mosque had become the base of HT recruitment in the earliest stage and this was later expanded into 'secular' campuses in Java and Jakarta, still later reaching beyond Java through the Campus Preaching Institute (*Lembaga Dakwah Kampus*, LDK). However, Al-Baghdadi and bin Nuh did not openly use the name of Hizbut Tahrir in their first *da'wa* because of the suspicion of the state towards expressions of political Islam in the early New Order era.

Although HTI grew in strength since its arrival in the 1980s, it only emerged into public view in 2000 when it hosted the first International Caliphate Conference in Jakarta. HTI's emergence was in line with the proliferation of Islamic radical groups after the end of the Soeharto regime in May 1998. The following discussion therefore will briefly delineate the dynamic development of HT from the New Order era to the post-New Order era.

The Campus *Da'wa* Movement and HTI in New Order Era in Indonesia

The emergence of HTI should be seen in the broader context of the emergence of preaching movements on Indonesian campuses in the 1980s. This was part of an Islamic resurgence among the younger Muslim generation since the late 1970s, marked by a growing number of young people attending the mosques, not only to pray but also to learn about and discuss Islam. Moreover, there were many Islamic activities organized by students at secular campuses and many female students, from senior high school to university, started to wear the veil (*jilbab*).[27] In the 1980s in particular, various Islamic groups espousing a transnational ideology, known as *harakah* (the movement), began to take shape under the various campus Islamic preaching institutions (LDK) and the public mosques.[28] In contrast to the larger established traditionalist and modernist streams, these groups lacked a social and cultural base within Indonesia and were more concerned with international issues. Because of their global orientation, one writer recently termed them 'global santri'.[29]

The emergence of campus preaching movements and the attraction of Islam to young Muslim students was generated by multiple factors. Firstly, the rebirth of Islamic revivalism marked by the 1979 Iranian revolution had a profound impact on Islamic movements across the world, including those in Indonesia. The event opened the eyes of young Muslims in Indonesia and elsewhere to the possibility that Islam could serve as a counter to the Western ideologies which dominate the Muslim world. The influence of the revolution could be seen in the early 1980s when many female students began to wear a new kind of Islamic clothing called *jilbab*, adopting its style

[27]Rifki Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam: A Study of the Islamic Resurgence Movement among the Youth in Bandung, Indonesia* (Canberra: ANU E-Press, 1995) 4; Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability* (Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1999) 174.
[28]Rifki Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam: A Study of the Islamic....*
[29]Yon Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesia: The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party* (Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2008) 42-43.

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from Iran.[30] Translations of books of Iranian Shi'i radical thinkers such as Ali Shari'ati and Imam Khomeini became available.[31] Indonesian Muslims, although Sunni in majority, viewed the Iranian revolution as a triumph of Islam, looking at its universal spirit, regardless of theological differences. This phenomenon also contributed to the appeal of the preaching movements in campuses.

Secondly, the New Order state marginalized political Islam and suppressed student activism on the campuses. The relationship between Islam and the state, especially in the early 1980s, was antipathetic. The experience of Muslim rebellions in the 1950s, which had involved leaders of the Islamic party Masyumi, led Soeharto to consistently opposed any aspirations or expressions related to the idea of an Islamic state. The Soeharto government was inclined rather to support cultural Islam, championed by the public intellectual Nurcholish Madjid in the 1970s, with his famous slogan "Islam Yes, Islamic Party No!", while surpressing what Liddle calls 'scripturalist Islam'.[32] In this respect, Soeharto appeared to emulate the old Dutch colonial policy by "emasculating political Islam while outwardly promoting its spritual health".[33] This was reflected in Soeharto's policies such as eliminating Islamic symbols from political activism, eliminating Islamic-based parties and forcing Muslim politicians away from the political arena. The de-politicisation of Islam reached its climax when Soeharto mandated that all Islamic parties combine to form the United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, PPP) in 1973. In addition, in 1983 Soeharto also regulated that all parties and associations had to accept Pancasila as their sole ideological foundation.[34] This regulation affected Islamic student organisations such HMI, PMII, IMM, PII, which were forced to change their stated ideological basis from Islam to Pancasila.

While suppressing political Islam, the government also restricted student political activism. In 1977, for example, the Ministry of Education banned all student involvement in politics. This step was followed by the dissolution of Student Governments (*Dewan Mahasiswa, Dema*) in 1978.[35] On 19 April 1978, the Ministry of Education released the policy of Normalisation of Campuses (*Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus*, NKK) and on 17 May 1978 it released the concept of Coordinating Campus Board (*Badan Koordinasi Kampus*, BKK).[36] This policy led the campus bureaucracy under the rectors and deans to control student activities on the campuses. As a result,

[30]For more information about this issue See Suzanne Brenner, "Reconstructing Self and Identity: Javanese Muslim Women and the 'Veil'," in *American Ethnologist* 23:4 (1996) 673-697
[31]Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam*, 22.
[32]See R. William Liddle, "Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Political Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia", in *Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Development in Indonesian Islamic Thought* (Arizona: Arizona State, 1996).
[33]Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998) 120.
[34]M. Din Syamsuddin, *Islam dan Politik Era Orde Baru* (Jakarta: Logos, 2000) 66-67.
[35]Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam*, 13.
[36]Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2000) 58-59.

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students became inactive and no longer openly engaged with the social and political problems of the nation. According to Rosyad, "their ideal intellectual and spiritual dimensions disappeared".[37] Facing these restricted conditions, Muslim students attempted to find outlets through which they could express their ideas. It was at this point that the university mosques became the centre of student activities.[38] Vatikiotis cites Jalaluddin Rakhmat as saying, "the mosque became a sanctuary for the expression of political dissatisfaction and frustration."[39] This trend was particularly visible on the ITB campus.[40] In the mosques, Muslim students could freely discuss and express their ideas about Islam and politics outside the control of the state.

Thirdly, the emergence of Islamic movements in the early phase was facilitated by informal study clubs emulating the methods of the Muslim Brotherhood. These informal study clubs were initially facilitated by ITB lecturer Imaduddin Abdul Rahim (known as Bang Imad) who was concerned with Islamic teaching for students. The role of the Indonesian Islamic Predication Council (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*, DDII) was crucial in supporting intensive training courses in the campuses by providing preachers and funds.[41] Bang Imad regularly held Islamic training activities which he called LMD (*Latihan Manajemen Dakwah*, Preaching Management Training) which later evolved into the LDK.[42] LMD was a type of training in which students studied for about seven days without contact with the outside world. The students learned essential Islamic teachings, such as the sources of Islamic values, the Qur'an and Sunnah (Prophetic Tradition) and the Islamic faith (*Aqidah Islam*).[43] Attracted to this kind of training, students from various universities in Bandung, Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Medan and other areas came to the Salman Mosque of ITB. When these students returned to their home universities, they developed similar activities in their own universities. It was from these groups that the emergence of the Tarbiyah Movement, the Salafi group and Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia began.

Given the repressive nature of the authoritarian state toward the expression of political Islam, the HTI movement operated clandestinely. To avoid suspicion from the security services, HTI figures did not use HT in their publication and training courses, yet disseminated the idea of the need for the total implementation of *shari'a* and a

[37]Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam*, 13.
[38]Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam*, 14.
[39]Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998) 129.
[40]Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability* (Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1999) 174. For a detailed account of religious activities organized in Salman Mosque at ITB campus, see Abdul Aziz *et.al.*, *Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 1989) 207-287.
[41]Anthoni Bubalo and Greg Fealy, *Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia* (Australia: Lowy Institute, 2005) 60.
[42] Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam*, 25.
[43]Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam*, 26.

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caliphate.[44] According to Ismail Yusanto, the government at that time never succeeded in uncovering the existence of HT in Indonesia because its members kept a low profile in society.[45] In the Soeharto period, HTI's attention was focused on cultivating membership through *halqa* and expanding their network among Muslim student activists in Indonesia. HTI was in the culturing stage (*tatsqif*) of the three methods of *da'wa*. HTI operated as an underground organization led by Abdullah bin Nuh until his death in 1987, later succeeded by Muhammad Al-Khaththath.[46]

Since its inception, HTI was developed through LDK, along with other Islamic movements. This was due to the fact that HT arrived in Indonesia together with the coming of other *harakah* such as the Tarbiyah movement, Jama'ah Tabligh, and the Salafi group.[47] Initially, there was no separation between the movements; the cadre trainings were held together with the same subjects and tutors. However, from 1988 there was division among the movements due to sharpening ideological differences between them.[48] HTI used the LDK network as a channel for recruitment. In fact, the idea of establishing the LDK network was pioneered by leaders of HTI. An LDK network on the IPB campus in Bogor called *Badan Kerohanian Islam Mahasiswa* (BKIM, Student Association for Islamic Propagation) served as an important site for the earliest recruitment and dissemination of HT ideas. BKIM activists attended public sermons delivered by Abdullah bin Nuh and later joined the Pondok Pesantren Al-Ghazali to learn from him and Al-Bahgdadi on a regular basis.[49] Having dominated LDK in IPB Bogor, HTI activists then spread their wings by recruiting new members outside Bogor through the LDK network, such as LDK in the University of Padjajaran, Bandung, IKIP Malang, the University of Airlangga, Surabaya, the University of Hasanuddin, Makassar and the University of Gajah Mada, Yogyakarta.[50] After its split from other movements in LDK in 1994, HTI began to arrange its *da'wa* activities for the public without using the name of Hizbut Tahrir, while maintaining its network in the campuses. In this respect, HTI activists created "undercover organizations and activities like seminars, weekly learning circles and the publication of books and pamphlets". However, all of the activities of HTI in this period were limited to the level of the dissemination of ideas and recruitment, without moving further into mobilizing action in the street.

[44]Fealy, "Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia", 155.
[45]Jamhari *et.al*., "Menuju Khilafah Islamiyah: Gerakan Hizbuttahrir di Indonesia", in Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (eds.), *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2004) 174.
[46]Salim, *The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, 131. After al-Khaththath, the HTI leader is now occupied by Hafidz Abdurrahman.
[47]Salim, *The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, 133.
[48]Elizabeth Fuller Collins, "Dakwah and Democracy: The Significance of Partai Keadilan and Hizbut Tahrir", Unpublished paper presented at an International Seminar on Islamic Militant Movement in Southeast Asia, Jakarta 22-23 July 2003, 9.
[49]See Elizabeth Fuller Collins, "Dakwah and Democracy and Hardianto, "Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia", 142.
[50]See Salim, *The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, 137-142.

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HTI in the Post-Authoritarian Regime: Towards Engaging with the *Umma*

The fall of the Soeharto regime on 21 May 1998 paved the way for political relaxation and democratization in Indonesia. A newly expanded public sphere provided an opportunity for political Islam to emerge. While the growing trend of political Islam was evinced by the proliferation of Islamic parties, there also emerged a number of Muslim paramilitary groups and Islamic radical movements. According to Effendy, the birth of these groups was not an immediate response to Indonesian's new democracy but rather more a reaction to the socio-religious and political situation in the period of transition, which for these groups did not reflect Muslim aspirations.[51] This included the weakness of the state in dealing with socio-religious conflicts, in law enforcement of gambling and prostitution and the regulation of alcoholic beverages. All of the groups appeared to aspire for the implementation of *shari'a* as the alternative.

While many radical Islamic groups had risen to public view in 1998, HTI emerged on May 2000, when it convened the international conference on the Islamic caliphate at the Tennis Indoor Stadium, Senayan, Jakarta. This was the first public activity conducted under the banner of Hizbut Tahrir, openly introducing its ideas, programs and leaders.[52] The conference was attended by 5,000 HTI supporters and attracted extensive media coverage. The speakers invited were HT leaders from local and overseas branches such as Dr. Muhammad Utsman and Muhammad al-Khaththath (Indonesia), Ismail al-Wahwah (Australia) and Syarifuddin M. Zain (Malaysia).[53] The main issue discussed was the importance of reviving the Islamic caliphate as a response to Muslim problems. Since 2000, HTI's public development has been noticeable in terms of membership, media and operations. The movement has now moved from the level of education to the level of interaction with the *umma.*

Organizing Rallies and Demonstrations

The most striking visibility of HTI is its protest movement in the street, in the form of rallies and demonstrations. Indeed, since the early 2000s, HTI has appeared as the most active Islamist movement in Indonesia to express its aspirations and demands in the street. In most cases, the HTI rallies have been systematically organized, at both the national and provincial level in response to national and international issues alike. In 2002, for example, HTI mobilized an estimated 12,000 members to stage a long march in Jakarta from the National Monument to Senayan stadium, demanding the implementation of *shari'a* law through the re-insertion of the Jakarta Charter into the constitution.[54] This was a domestic response to the annual session of the MPR

[51]Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003) 217-218.
[52]Salim, *The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, 145.
[53]Herry Mohammad and Kholis Bahtiar Bakri, "Khilafah Islamiyah: Ibarat Pelari Maraton," in *Gatra*, 30: IV (10 June 2000) 21.
[54]Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, *Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir: Partai Politik Islam Ideologis* (Jakarta: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2004) iv.

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(Parliament), then deliberating on this amendment to the 1945 Constitution. In relation to global issues, in 2003 HTI organized rallies in front of the embassies of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, UK, the People's Republic of China and France to protest against US involvement in Afghanistan.[55] HTI also utilizes Islamic celebrations to hold rallies in big cities about similar issues. Recently, on 4 January 2009, while commemorating the Islamic New Year, HTI simultaneously conducted rallies in several big cities in Indonesia condemning the Israel's aggression on Gaza. In most of its rallies, HTI puts forth messages of blame against the capitalist system and Western ideas as the source of the world's problems and makes the call to Muslims to re-establish the caliphate as the only alternative.

Organizing Public Seminars

The intellectual activity of HTI finds its expression through seminars and publications. This is one strategy to disseminate HTI ideas and to win support from the educated segment of Indonesian society. Seminars are energetically convened at international, national, provincial or regional levels in response to global, national and local issues. Two international caliphate conferences, for instance, have been held in Jakarta in 2000 and 2007. The latter conference was attended by around 80,000 supporters and was considered to be the largest international HT conference in the world. More recently, since mid- 2008, HTI has regularly convened monthly seminars at the provincial and national level which they call '*Halqa Islam dan Peradaban*' (Seminars on Islam and Civilization), addressing various current issues. On such occasions, HTI usually invites speakers from among intellectuals, Muslim scholars and representatives of government, with speakers from HTI itself. However, most of the speakers invited present an Islamist point of view or are sympathizers with HTI's views. Moreover, the issues raised and the discussions which follow tend to be directed to supporting the HTI agenda. In most of its seminars, HTI contacts media groups in order to raise its voice and profile within the Indonesian public sphere.

Creating Media

The use of the media and publishing is another intellectual means by which HTI gets its messages out to a public audience. It also serves as a means of maintaining communication and unity of thought among the members. HTI media take the form of pamphlets, bulletins, magazines, tabloids, booklets, books, DVDs and websites.[56] HTI has published a weekly pamphlet, *Buletin al-Islam* (Bulletin of Islam) since 1994. However, its circulation was initially limited to HTI activists. Salim notes that the pamphlet became "their intra-group communication channel". It had been published under a disguised identification until early 2000, when it began using the name of

[55]Salim, *The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, 45.
[56]Salim, *The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, 140-144.

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Syabab Hizbut Tahrir (Hizbut Tahrir Youth). Since then, the bulletin, which comprises a four-page pamphlet, began to be distributed to the public through the mosques at the Friday prayers every week. Another important publication for HTI is *al-Wa'ie* (Awareness, Consciousness) a monthly magazine with glossy covers, running to about 15,000 copies per edition.[57]63 More recently, since late 2008, HTI began publishing a 32 page monthly tabloid of good quality called *Media Umat* (Media for the Muslim Community). Translations of HT books and accounts of HTI leaders, especially the founder, Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, are also important. HTI publishers include al-Izzah in Bangil, East Java, Pustaka Thariqul Izzah and Mahabbah Cipta Insani in Bogor, West Java, and more recently, HTI Press in Jakarta. The latter publisher has been publishing specifically official and standard books of HTI (*mutabannat*) with updated revisions from the HT central board. The *mutabannat* books refer to the most salient works of An-Nabhani, which are used in *halqa*. It is important however to note that HTI books and magazines are not publicly sold in book stores; they have their own outlets, which suggests that the primary targeted consumers are HTI members themselves. Like branches of HT overseas, HTI also has its own website, dating from 2004 (www.hizbut-tahrir.or.id) allowing members to follow up to date information on HTI activities. The website facilitates a mailing list, online HT books and weekly pamphlets which can be accessed freely.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has discussed the origins, emergence and the dynamic development of one transnational Islamic movement in Indonesia. Exploring Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, both in the political authoritarian and reform eras, it suggests that its emergence and development has been shaped by the shifting nature of the Indonesian state. The emergence of HTI together with other Islamist movements through Islamic study clubs (*halqa*) on tertiary campuses was related to Islamic resurgence in the late 1970s, spurred on by several factors: firstly, the global factor of the Iranian revolution of 1979, which inspired the revival of Islam as a social, political and cultural force in Muslim countries. Secondly, the authoritarian nature of the New Order regime as it took repressive measures towards political Islam and banned political student activities on the campuses. Students therefore found Islam to be an alternative, focusing their activities on campus mosques where they learned and discussed Islam through mental training and Islamic study circles.

The religious activities were facilitated by Imaduddin Abdul Rahim who emulated the teaching method of the Muslim Brotherhood. It was against this backdrop that HT was introduced to Indonesia by Abdurrahman Al-Baghdadi, an HT activist who was

[57]Fealy, "Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia", 158.

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invited by Abdullah bin Nuh to develop his Pesantren in Bogor. Interacting with Muslim student activists of LDK-IPB, they transferred HT ideas and organized *halqa.*

HTI in the New Order era did not openly use its name, but rather operated underground, maintaining a low profile and focusing on recruitment and education as well as establishing a network of LDK across university campuses in Indonesia. After the fall of Soeharto, HTI emerged in 2000 with its International Caliphate Conference in Senayan Stadium, Jakarta. Since then, HTI has advanced its cause by establishing an HTI central board and expanding branches into several provinces, producing high quality media, organizing seminars and public discussions and conducting rallies in response to both national and international issues. Benefiting from the newly democratic political sphere, HTI has managed to win the support of ordinary Indonesian people by engaging with national and local issues in order to achieve its agenda of establishing *shari'a* and a global caliphate.

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